Causes and Consequences of Tenancy-Labor Interlinked Contract in the Agricultural Labor Market of West Bengal

Amit Kundu

The IUP Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2009, vol. VI, issue 1, 70-82

Abstract: In order to alleviate acute poverty and vulnerability in the absence of sufficient employment opportunities both in the farm and non-farm sectores, the landless agricultural laborers of West Bengal have a tie with the landlord in an interlinked contract, where the land market is linked up with the labor market. This type of interlinked contract is a new version of Employer’s risk hypothesis. A landless agricultural laborer will be inclined to bind himself with such an interlinked contract at the beginning of each year provided he has a large family labor force, and a regular savings habit. But he will not be inclined to such a contract if he gets sufficient employment in terms of man days either in the farm or non-farm sector in his locality. If he enters into such a contract, then the total size of land he has to take on lease from the landlord prior to the agricultural season is positively related to the total number of able-bodied family labor force. This paper also explains that the interlinked contract, besides abating poverty of the landless agricultural laborer, also reiterates the importance of land reforms for poverty eradication.

Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:icf:icfjag:v:06:y:2009:i:1:p:70-82

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