JOINT LIABILITY LENDING IN MICROCREDIT MARKETS WITH ADVERSE SELECTION: A SURVEY

Alessandro Fedele

The IUP Journal of Bank Management, 2006, vol. V, issue 2, 55-63

Abstract: This article reviews recent literature on joint liability lending in micro-credit markets characterized by adverse selection. This mode of lending consists of granting individual loans to wealthless borrowers provided that they form groups. If a group does not fully repay its obligations, then the microlender cuts off all members from future credit until the debt is repaid. Joint liability lending is able to extract information through a peer selection mechanism, with the effect of raising both repayment rates and welfare with respect to individual lending.

Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:icf:icfjbm:v:5:y:2006:i:2:p:55-63

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