Do Managers of Mutual Institutions Choose Efficiency-Improving Mergers? The Recent Experience of Japanese Credit Associations

Nobuyoshi Yamori and Kozo Harimaya

The IUP Journal of Bank Management, 2010, vol. IX, issue 1 & 2, 7-11

Abstract: Because of the unique corporate governance feature of mutual institutions, managers are expected to maximize their own interests at the expense of other stakeholders’ interests. However, this study finds that managers of Japanese mutual banks do not behave as suggested.

Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:icf:icfjbm:v:9:y:2010:i:1&2:p:7-11

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