Legislatures and Government Spending: Evidence from Democratic Countries
Roberto Ricciuti ()
The IUP Journal of Governance and Public Policy, 2010, vol. V, issue 1 & 2, 41-58
This paper studies the relationship between the legislature size with respect to general government and welfare spending. According to the theory, the legislature size has an indefinite effect on government spending because logrolling and transaction costs have canceling effects. Bicameralism is expected to have a negative effect because of the increased transaction cost of finding a viable majority in two houses with different constituencies. The study uses a cross-section of 75 countries over the period 1990-1998 controlling for some institutional features that differ among countries. We find that both legislature size and bicameralism do not have a significant effect on the two types of spending.
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Working Paper: Legislatures and government spending: evidence from democratic countries (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:icf:icfjgp:v:05:y:2010:i:1&2:p:41-58
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