Asymmetric Information, Tax Evasion and Alternative Instruments of Government Revenue

Rangan Gupta

The IUP Journal of Monetary Economics, 2006, vol. IV, issue 1, 75 - 89

Abstract: Using a pure-exchange overlapping generations model, characterized with tax evasion and information asymmetry between the government (the social planner) and the financial intermediaries, the author discusses the optimal tax and seigniorage plans, derived from the welfare maximizing objective of the social planner. It is observed that irrespective of whether the economy is characterized by tax evasion or asymmetric information, a benevolent social planner maximizing welfare and simultaneously financing the budget constraint, should optimally rely on explicit, rather than implicit taxation.

Date: 2006
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Working Paper: Asymmetric Information, Tax Evasion and Alternative Instruments of Government Revenue (2005)
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