The conflict handling mechanisms of intelligent logistics ecological chains: a perspective of trust behaviour under information asymmetry
Weihua Liu,
Xinran Shen,
Yanjie Liang and
Di Wang
European Journal of Industrial Engineering, 2021, vol. 15, issue 6, 777-802
Abstract:
The intelligent logistics ecological chain (ILEC) imposes strict requirements on the selection of logistics service providers (LSPs), while the trust behaviour and information asymmetry are two key factors need to be considered. We consider the vertical quality difference of LSP in ILEC and information asymmetry and build the Stacklberg games, to find the conditions for the occurrence of conflicts caused by quality fraud. Then we propose blockchain mechanism to resolve this conflict. We derive important conclusions and contributions. First, when logistics platform integrator (LPI) has low (high) trust in LSP, LSP always chooses to be honest (mimic). Second, there is a win-win situation between LPI and high-quality LSP, while a zero-sum game between LPI and low-quality LSP. Finally, when cooperating with low-quality LSP in low (high) trust levels, LPI can adopt blockchain technology (punishment mechanism). [Submitted: 27 June 2020; Accepted: 20 November 2020]
Keywords: intelligent logistics ecological chain; ILEC; trust behaviour; blockchain; conflict handling mechanism. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=118517 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:eujine:v:15:y:2021:i:6:p:777-802
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in European Journal of Industrial Engineering from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sarah Parker ().