Cooperative moves in a non-cooperative game

Robert T. Jones and E.C.H. Veendorp

Global Business and Economics Review, 2005, vol. 7, issue 1, 25-30

Abstract: We try to show that the use of alternating decision making in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma type game may enable sophisticated players to achieve perpetual cooperation starting from any initial position and without any prior communication, and that the ability of players to do so depends on the relative magnitudes of the pay-offs in the stage game.

Keywords: game theory; cooperative games; non-cooperative games; cooperation; alternating decision making; pay-offs. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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