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Examining the impact of relative standing using an ultimatum bargaining game experiment

Muqun Li and Mark Pingle ()

Global Business and Economics Review, 2007, vol. 9, issue 2/3, 183-201

Abstract: This paper presents the results of an experiment designed to examine the extent to which a decision-maker's relative standing affects bargaining behaviour. In each session, 14 participants played a series of one-shot ultimatum bargaining games. In one treatment, the participants were made aware of only their own cumulative outcome rank as they started each new game, while in a second treatment both their own rank and the rank of their bargaining partner was known. The results indicate relative standing does affect bargaining behaviour, particularly when the decision-maker knows both his own rank and the rank of the bargaining partner. A primary finding is that the provision of relative standing information can enhance well-being because it promotes the formation of mutually beneficial bargaining agreements.

Keywords: relative standing; positional concern; status; bargaining games; decision making; bargaining behaviour; well-being; mutually beneficial agreements. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:ids:gbusec:v:9:y:2007:i:2/3:p:183-201