Increased compensation costs as an externality of mandatory executive compensation disclosure: evidence from Canada

Patrice Gelinas, Michel Magnan and Sylvie St-Onge

International Journal of Business Environment, 2009, vol. 2, issue 3, 376-390

Abstract: As Canadian policy makers review the disclosure expectations regarding executive compensation paid by publicly traded companies, we investigate how the implementation of mandatory executive compensation disclosure impacts executive compensation levels. A regression analysis of Canadian CEOs' pay increases between 1992 and 1997 reveals that disclosure regulation disciplines some firms to align the pay with that of relevant peers, but it stimulates others to target the top pay level in the market.

Keywords: executive compensation; disclosure regulations; Canada; CEO compensation; governance; public policy; regulatory environment; empirical study; publicly traded firms; private firms; business environment; mandatory disclosure; pay increases. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijbenv:v:2:y:2009:i:3:p:376-390

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