Internal corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance: evidence from the UK's top FTSE 100 listed companies
Ibrahim Khalifa Elmghaamez and
Eritobi Akintoye
International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics, 2021, vol. 15, issue 2, 190-214
Abstract:
This paper examines the relationship between internal corporate governance mechanisms and the financial performance of the UK's top FTSE 100 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. By using a sample of 59 firms from the top FTSE 100 firms over the period from 2013 to 2018, our findings demonstrated that the lower number of board size and independent directors on the board, the better financial performance of the UK's top FTSE 100 listed firms. However, our study revealed that better financial performance is positively correlated with greater proportion of women on boards. Additionally, we found that board meeting is insignificantly associated with the financial performance of listed firms. This study has important implications for policy makers in the UK to have more women on boards and to decrease board size and the number of independent directors to the optimal size, since there is no one size fits all firms.
Keywords: corporate governance mechanisms; financial performance; board size; board meeting; board independence; women on boards; UK. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijbget:v:15:y:2021:i:2:p:190-214
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