Family pyramidal holdings and board of directors

Najah Attig

International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics, 2007, vol. 3, issue 4, 394-406

Abstract: In this paper we relate the board's attributes to the firm's opacity as measured by the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread. We find that larger boards and outside directors are associated with reduced opacity, especially in freestanding firms. However, directors' excess control is associated with a significant increase in firm's opacity. We also find that the presence of family pyramidal holding defuses any potential monitoring benefits of board attributes. Our findings suggest that the firm's ultimate ownership structure is not neutral in determining the monitoring effectiveness of the board of directors. This might help explain existing mixed evidence on the monitoring role of the board of directors.

Keywords: board size; outside directors; opacity; family pyramidal holding; corporate governance; business governance; ownership structure; monitoring effectiveness; board of directors. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=15208 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijbget:v:3:y:2007:i:4:p:394-406

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sarah Parker ().