The challenge of business self-regulation: revisiting the foundations
Paul Dragos Aligica
International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics, 2008, vol. 4, issue 2, 169-188
Abstract:
The rise of international businesses' self-regulation regimes offers a challenging case study for those interested in the relationship between ethics and business. Regulation without external enforcement has always been a focal point for explorations into the relationship between morality and economic behaviour. Are self-regulatory arrangements viable? Are they stable? What are the factors and conditions that determine their stability and viability? Using these questions as a vehicle, the article explores the functional anatomy of self-regulation. As such, it is an attempt to offer a broad conceptual picture in a way that creates a bridge between the current developments in the literature and the intellectual traditions that have framed the setting of the current intellectual efforts exploring the issue. Therefore the article may be seen as a conceptual and theoretical introduction to the topic as well as an attempt to frame it in a way that connects and integrates it to a broader intellectual perspective.
Keywords: business self-regulation; international business regimes; trust; social norms; rational choice; reputation; social cooperation; Adam Smith. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijbget:v:4:y:2008:i:2:p:169-188
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