Pseudo-generics and the generic competition paradox in a universal healthcare's prescription drug market

Kenichi Ohkita

International Journal of Business and Globalisation, 2016, vol. 17, issue 1, 111-122

Abstract: This paper uses game theory to analyse the likelihood of the generic competition paradox in a universal healthcare's prescription drug market with and without the availability of a pseudo-generic. It is found that under certain conditions the price of the brand-name drug increases after patent expiry. The generic competition paradox is found to require full market coverage and to be more likely to occur with a larger difference in the perceived quality of the brand-name drug and its generic alternatives, higher marginal costs of production, or lower insurance coverage.

Keywords: generic competition paradox; GCP; brand-name drugs; pseudo-generic drugs; universal healthcare; prescription drugs; pseudo-generics; prescription drug markets; game theory; patent expiry; perceived quality; marginal costs; production costs; insurance coverage. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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