Game theoretic models in fleet performance-based maintenance contracts

H. Husniah, Andriana and Bermawi P. Iskandar

International Journal of Business and Globalisation, 2020, vol. 26, issue 1/2, 41-56

Abstract: A fleet performance-based maintenance service contract (PB-MSC) is a service offered by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) or an external service agent (service provider) to a company that owns a dump truck fleet to support its business processes. The trucks are sold with two-dimensional warranty; preventive maintenance is a part of the warranty package. We study a PB-MSC which provides some incentives to the OEM or the agent if the performance (i.e., availability) of a fleet goes beyond the target. Two options of PB-MSC offered to the owner. The decision problems for the OEM (or agent) and the owner are formulated using the Stackelberg game theory, in which the OEM or agent acts as a leader and the owner acts as a follower. The pricing structure and the number of servers for the optimal strategy for the agent and the optimal option for the owner are obtained.

Keywords: fleet maintenance contract; two-dimensional warranty; expected profit maximisation; non-cooperative games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=109830 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijbglo:v:26:y:2020:i:1/2:p:41-56

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in International Journal of Business and Globalisation from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sarah Parker ().