Takeovers, corporate control, and return to target shareholders

Han Donker and Saif Zahir

International Journal of Corporate Governance, 2008, vol. 1, issue 1, 106-134

Abstract: In this paper, we investigated the impact of ownership concentration on the returns to target shareholders. In order to determine such impact, we have employed three models namely: the atomistic shareholder model; the large shareholder model; the single shareholder model. We found empirical evidence that the degree of ownership concentration in target firms has a significant negative effect on the returns to shareholders. These findings are consistent with the theoretical takeover models which support a negative relationship between bid premium and ownership concentration of target firms.

Keywords: takeovers; free-rider problem; corporate control; ownership structure; corporate governance; atomistic shareholders; large shareholders; single shareholders; shareholder returns. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijcgov:v:1:y:2008:i:1:p:106-134

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