CEO pay, firm performance, and corporate governance in India's listed firms

Manju Jaiswall and Michael Firth

International Journal of Corporate Governance, 2009, vol. 1, issue 3, 227-240

Abstract: In this study we examine the determinants of CEO compensation in large listed Indian companies. There is a positive relation between pay and a firm's performance. We find that remuneration committees are related to higher CEO compensation and there is no association between remuneration committees and pay-performance sensitivities. Thus, remuneration committees do not act in the way predicted by governance guidelines. CEOs in family firms are paid more. This suggests that CEOs use their power as a member of the controlling family to obtain higher compensation. The minority shareholders are therefore disadvantaged. CEOs in risky firms are paid less.

Keywords: top management pay; financial performance; corporate governance; remuneration committee; family business; CEO pay; CEO compensation; India; firm performance. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijcgov:v:1:y:2009:i:3:p:227-240

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