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Corporate governance and performance during normal and crisis periods: evidence from an emerging market perspective

Karen Watkins, Jaap Spronk and Dick van Dijk

International Journal of Corporate Governance, 2009, vol. 1, issue 4, 382-399

Abstract: This paper examines the effects of internal corporate governance arrangements on emerging markets' firm performance. Unlike most literature on the topic, we study both normal and crisis periods. Using 176 Mexican companies as case study, we find through a random effects panel data model significant outcome differences, according to corporate governance characteristics. In general, bank links represent negative governance schemes, while having family ties, belonging to business groups, and being export-oriented constitute positive governance mechanisms. Nonetheless, these conclusions are not robust during all periods. For instance, during normal episodes having group affiliation weakens performance, while the contrary is found during crisis times.

Keywords: corporate governance; bank links; family ties; business groups; export orientation; ADRs; American depository receipts; firm performance; financial crisis; emerging markets; Mexico; case study; panel data. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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