 Auditor-client compatibility and corporate governance effectiveness: an empirical analysisAhmed M. Abdel-Meguid International Journal of Corporate Governance, 2012, vol. 3, issue 1, 19-45 Abstract: This paper examines a new facet of the auditor-client relationship, the extent to which the auditor's portfolio of audited clients' industries matches its client's portfolio of business segments which I refer to as the auditor-client compatibility. The paper examines how compatibility affects audit quality and consequently the auditor's governance effectiveness. Using a sample of clients of big auditing firms, I empirically examine the effect of compatibility on earnings quality proxied by absolute discretionary accruals as a manifestation of audit quality and in turn corporate governance effectiveness. I document a negative relation between compatibility and discretionary accruals suggesting that compatibility contributes to effective governance. This result holds for several robustness checks. The study introduces a new measure of industry specialisation: compatibility. It also highlights how the multi-segment nature of companies has auditing and governance implications, a dimension that has been relatively ignored in the auditing and corporate governance literatures. Keywords: auditor-client compatibility; industry specialisation; corporate governance; audit quality; earnings quality; auditing. (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijcgov:v:3:y:2012:i:1:p:19-45 Access Statistics for this article More articles in International Journal of Corporate Governance from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd |
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