 Limit your applications. Dealing with congested markets in the matching procedureJanine Balter, Michela Rancan and Olena Senyuta International Journal of Computational Economics and Econometrics, 2016, vol. 6, issue 4, 413-431 Abstract: We study congested matching markets, such as the PhD academic job market, and consider alternative mechanisms that could be implemented by a social planner. Building on the Gale and Shapley algorithm, we analyse (i) a procedure accounting for a limit in the number of applications PhD graduates can submit (PhD-LIMIT), and (ii) a procedure accounting for a limit in the number of applications universities can evaluate (UNI-LIMIT).We find that the PhD-LIMIT procedure improves the matching outcome and is preferable to a UNI-LIMIT procedure. The optimal limit in the number of applications balances the trade-off between being unmatched and gaining a better match in the aggregate, and the benefit can be considerable if the graduates' preferences over the positions are not very correlated. Overall, we suggest a direction to improve the matching market for PhD candidates by improving the outcome of their matches and lowering the hiring costs for universities. Keywords: matching markets; truncation; Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance; congested markets; PhD academic job market; PhD graduates; graduate preferences; university hiring costs. (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijcome:v:6:y:2016:i:4:p:413-431 Access Statistics for this article More articles in International Journal of Computational Economics and Econometrics from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.