Turning financial markets inside out: how insider trading regulation really works

Ulrika Sjodin, Thomas Bay and Elton G. McGoun

International Journal of Critical Accounting, 2010, vol. 2, issue 4, 419-436

Abstract: Insider trading regulation produces excess speculation and stimulates deceptive stock exchange trading – the very things that it is supposed to eliminate. In Sweden, this was part of a deliberate political agenda to make financial markets livelier and more exciting, almost as if they were games. Now, the so-called 'outsiders' (the public) are in fact confined inside the game, while the 'insiders' (the market professionals) remain outside the game controlling the action.

Keywords: insiders; outsiders; insider trading; insider regulation; excess speculation; games; financial markets; stock markets; stock exchange trading; Sweden. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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