Regulating financial crises in the USA, the dialectic and beyond part A

Aida Sy and Anthony Tinker

International Journal of Critical Accounting, 2017, vol. 9, issue 1, 1-17

Abstract: Regulation against the next final crises is a tragic tale of regulatory missteps. Regulators are cowered by congressmen who are in the pockets of lobbies and vested interests. The Volker Rule that attempts to separate the high risk investments by the large banks from their commercial banking (the latter is FDIC insured) and the banks have lobbed to have their high risk investments protected by the FDIC funds. The Volker Rule simply attempted to prevent the banks high risk investments from enjoying a back stop using the public funded FDIC. Without Volker, the banks would engage in what is termed a 'morale hazard'. Volker's original simple one-page solution has been batter-down by congressional lobbies into a 100 pages plus list of 'exceptions' (read loop-holes).

Keywords: financial crises; regulation; dialectic; USA; Volker; FDIC; SEC; Dobb Frank. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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