Risk, production and conflict when utilities are as if certain
Kjell Hausken ()
International Journal of Decision Sciences, Risk and Management, 2010, vol. 2, issue 3/4, 228-251
The article analyses a production and conflict model of risk, supplementing the common rent seeking analysis. Agents differ in attitudes toward risk, productive efficiencies, fighting efficiencies and resources for production versus fighting. A fighting decisiveness parameter determines distribution of utilities. Skaperdas' (1991) analysis of conflict and risk attitudes is generalised from a symmetric to an asymmetric risk function, from two agents to many agents of two kinds, and the fraction of risk seekers is endogenised. Specific functional forms of the utility function and production function are used. The amount of fighting increases in the amount of risk aversion, contrary to received rent seeking theory, but consistently with much experience. Surprisingly, higher production costs or lower fighting costs for risk seekers cause higher utility for risk seekers, contrary to the received theory of higher utility to risk avoiders. We show how the first agent taking on risk benefits, given that the other agents remain risk averse, whereas risk seeking by all agents is the worst scenario.
Keywords: risk modelling; productive efficiencies; production; fighting efficiencies; conflict; cardinal utility; risk aversion; rent seeking theory; risk seeking. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijdsrm:v:2:y:2010:i:3/4:p:228-251
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in International Journal of Decision Sciences, Risk and Management from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Carmel O'Grady ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).