Stock option fraud detection and an analysis for its reasons: Arabic Republic of Egypt case

Zakia M. Alaa Eldeen and Ahmed F. Elbayoumi

International Journal of Economics and Accounting, 2013, vol. 4, issue 2, 123-137

Abstract: This paper investigates how stock option turned from an incentive for good management to a tool of management fraud. The objective of this paper is accomplished through studying the stock option phenomenon in the Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE). Stock option grants data are obtained from all firms that have stock option grants and listed in the Egyptian stock market. The empirical study covers the period from 2006 through 2009. Detecting stock option fraud and distinguishing between control and fraud firms was done through calculating the cumulative abnormal returns before and after stock option grants. Results of this research reveal that the incidence of stock option fraud is higher in unscheduled option grants compared to scheduled ones. These results strongly support that the reason of stock option fraud in ARE is dating games rather than news announcements manipulation.

Keywords: executive compensation; stock options; stock option fraud; scheduled option grants; unscheduled option grants; fraud companies; control companies; Egypt; fraud detection; stock option grants. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=55168 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijecac:v:4:y:2013:i:2:p:123-137

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in International Journal of Economics and Accounting from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sarah Parker ().