Monotone vs. non-monotone incentive structures: an experimental analysis

Christian Lukas

International Journal of Economics and Business Research, 2018, vol. 16, issue 1, 12-34

Abstract: This paper reports results from an experiment studying contract choice and effort provision under different contracts in a long-term agency relationship. Principals can choose between a theoretically optimal non-monotone contract N and a monotone contract M. Agents in general provide more effort under M than under N. Information about incentive compatibility further increases effort provision under contract M but not under contract N. However, principals who constantly select contract N realise the highest payoffs.

Keywords: contract choice; agency; effort; experiment; non-monotone; incentives. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=93370 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijecbr:v:16:y:2018:i:1:p:12-34

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in International Journal of Economics and Business Research from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sarah Parker ().