Competition policy in periods of economic downturn

Panagiotis Fotis

International Journal of Economics and Business Research, 2012, vol. 4, issue 5, 560-576

Abstract: This paper attempts to cast light on the main principles of the industrial restructuring agreements (crisis cartels) from a European perspective. For this purpose, I will explore the basic fundamentals of theory of harm concerning the formation of cartels during economic downturn in specific oligopolistic markets and I will analyse basic characteristics of past European cases. I also survey the Greek fish farming crisis cartel case.

Keywords: competition policies; economic downturns; crisis cartels; industrial restructuring agreements; imperfect oligopoly markets; cyclical overcapacity; structural overcapacity; anti-trust laws; Europe; harm theory; oligopolistic markets; Greece; fish farming; EU; European Union; EC; European Commission; Tokai Carbon; price fixing; specialty graphites; Imperial Chemical Industries; ICI; European Community; cast glass; Italy; case law; legal decisions; Saint-Gobain Industries; Fabbrica Pisana; alloy surcharges; seamless steel tubes; Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi; ENI; Montedison; Carbon AG; Hellenic Competition Commission; fishing industry; aquaculture; economics; business research. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijecbr:v:4:y:2012:i:5:p:560-576

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