Advertising, programme choice, and competition concerns in a mixed duopoly television broadcast industry

Rahul Nilakantan

International Journal of Economics and Business Research, 2014, vol. 8, issue 3, 309-323

Abstract: The data reveals pervasive state ownership of the television media as well as a large share of television audiences for state broadcasters the world over. The mixed economy literature in one-sided markets recognises the possibility that anti-competitive actions of state owned enterprises may lower social welfare as well as private competitor profit. We analyse the advertising intensity choices of broadcasters as well as the programme choice of viewers in a mixed duopoly television industry. We find that social welfare is higher, and contrary to their complaints, private broadcaster profits may be higher under mixed duopoly than under private duopoly.

Keywords: mixed duopoly; two sided markets; television; state broadcasters; advertising intensity; programme choice; competition policy; tv broadcasting; state ownership; state owned enterprises; SOEs; social welfare; profitability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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