Modelling the economic reciprocal relationship between student learning and professor teaching: an economic theoretical study and application
International Journal of Education Economics and Development, 2022, vol. 13, issue 3, 191-215
This research is to model the economic reciprocal relationship between student learning and professor teaching. We use a game theoretical model to study the effort provision by a professor and a student in knowledge production. We solve for the Nash equilibrium efforts analytically and to obtain the algebraic expressions for the players' equilibrium payoffs. Analysis suggested that two parties' effort investments (and payoffs) in teaching and learning is endogenously and positively correlated and simultaneously determined. This model is the most appropriate for studying independent study classes and thesis supervision as one-on-one experiences. We suggest that the university authority considers providing extra incentive-pay to professors who teach independent study classes - doing so would motivate faculty to increase their efforts toward student knowledge acquisition. More importantly, the theoretical model developed here may be useful in constructing empirical models for future investigation on this educational research and innovation problem.
Keywords: economic behaviour; static games of complete information; producer choice theory; Nash equilibrium; independent study classes. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijeded:v:13:y:2022:i:3:p:191-215
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