Sellers' quality claims in online auctions: evidence from eBay

Jianwei Hou

International Journal of Electronic Marketing and Retailing, 2007, vol. 1, issue 4, 355-369

Abstract: Quality uncertainty is a major problem in online auctions owing to the physical separation between sellers and bidders. To reduce potential bidders' quality uncertainty, sellers often send quality signals to assure their product quality. This study investigates whether a seller's self-made quality claim can be perceived as a quality signal by bidders. The empirical results show that a seller's self-made quality claim has no effect on the auction outcomes (e.g., odds of a sale and price) regardless of how reputable the seller is.

Keywords: online auctions; quality uncertainty; signalling theory; quality signal; self-made quality claims; eBay; internet marketing; internet retailing; electronic marketing; electronic retailing; etailing; online retailing; online marketing; product quality; quality assurance. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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