Entrenchment, director' networks, and CEO compensation

Najla Hamdi and Mohamed Gallali

International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business, 2020, vol. 39, issue 1/2, 2-26

Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between CEO compensation and the hypothesis of entrenchment according to the two approaches of governance (disciplinary and cognitive); a model is developed and tested. Based on a sample of 130 Canadian companies, composing the Toronto stock index S%P /TSX cover the period from 2005 to 2015, we examine whether networks are built for reasons of information gathering or for the accumulation of managerial influence. Our results suggest that in Canada the executive's network (centrality degree), in our case, enable the CEO to obtain higher compensation.

Keywords: executive remuneration; professional and social networks; corporate governance; entrenchment of executive. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijesbu:v:39:y:2020:i:1/2:p:2-26

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