Credibility of managerial forecast disclosure in market and regulated settings

Michael Dobler

International Journal of Financial Services Management, 2008, vol. 3, issue 1, 83-98

Abstract: This paper discusses the ability of models on cheap talk, and of audit and liability regulations, to provide analytically-based assessment of credibility of management forecast disclosure in market and regulated settings. While credibility is linked to restrictive conditions in pure market settings, regulatory enforcement does not necessarily contribute to forecast credibility. Key findings imply that ex ante approaches, including audit and tort liability in general, as well as partly verifiable disclosures supplementing the forecast and safe harbour provisions in particular can contribute to forecast credibility. Overall results suggest that the usefulness of managerial forecast disclosure should not be overestimated, as neither market nor regulatory mechanisms can overcome the problems related to non-verifiability.

Keywords: audit regulations; cheap talk; credibility; forecast disclosure; liability regulations; credibility; management forecasts; financial reporting. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijfsmg:v:3:y:2008:i:1:p:83-98

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