Global CO 2 emissions and unilateral action: policy implications of induced trade effects

Christoph Bohringer, Alfred Voß, Thomas F. Rutherford

International Journal of Global Energy Issues, 1998, vol. 11, issue 1/2/3/4, 18-22

Abstract: Unilateral action to combat an international externality such as CO₂ emissions produces efficiency losses through spill-over effects of carbon emission constraints on international markets. Emissions by non-participating countries may be increased through the relocation of energy-intensive production or reductions in the international oil price (so-called carbon leakage). Grandfathered emission permit systems are considered as one unilateral mitigation strategy which could avoid carbon leakage and increase efficiency of global CO₂ reduction as compared to unilateral uniform CO₂ taxes. This paper summarises results from a multiregional computable general equilibrium (CGE) model application [1] which show that the efficiency argument for the use of grandfathered permits depends crucially on the specification of international trade.

Keywords: CO 2 abatement strategies; unilateral action; grandfathered emission permits. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijgeni:v:11:y:1998:i:1/2/3/4:p:18-22

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