Transport, the strategic issue at stake for the future of natural gas in Europe: avoidance of hidden collusion and implementation of efficient pricing

Laurent David and Jacques Percebois

International Journal of Global Energy Issues, 2001, vol. 16, issue 4, 287-299

Abstract: Two main conditions must simultaneously be met for the European gas market to become a competitive market: 1) the absence of collusion among the various actors; 2) the setting of a fair and efficient tariff system for the gas pipelines. In order to evaluate the possibility of collusion among European operators, we give in the first part of the paper a picture of the different actors involved in the upstream segment and the transport-distribution one. We show in the second part that the regulators have to make two kinds of choices concerning the transport system pricing with TPA: 1) a choice concerning the type of control (price cap or cost plus); 2) a choice concerning the allocation of fixed costs between the capacity-booking charges and the actual transportation cost charges.

Keywords: collusion; oligopoly; transport tariffs; price cap; cost plus; allocation of fixed costs. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijgeni:v:16:y:2001:i:4:p:287-299

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