Negotiation and optimality in an economic model of global climate change

Hans W. Gottinger

International Journal of Global Energy Issues, 2002, vol. 18, issue 2/3/4, 181-201

Abstract: We suggest a two-country, two-sector model as a basis for the control of global climate change in which the dynamic time path of the world economy is analysed under the provision that the outcomes of a negotiation game generate the global optimal solution.

Keywords: economics of climate change; negotiation; international agreements. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=959 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijgeni:v:18:y:2002:i:2/3/4:p:181-201

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in International Journal of Global Energy Issues from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sarah Parker ().