Risk management versus incentives

Eyvind Aven, Kjell Lovas and Petter Osmundsen

International Journal of Global Energy Issues, 2006, vol. 26, issue 1/2, 158-169

Abstract: Portfolio theory indicates that risk management should take place at the group level. Hedging at the project level or in the individual business areas may lead to suboptimal results. However, the efficiency of a profit centre depends on its management's being able to influence factors that are crucial to the unit's financial results. Price hedging could be one such factor. In the wider perspective, this constitutes part of the balancing between centralisation and decentralisation. This article covers important elements of risk management and incentive design. It goes on to discuss the balancing of overall risk management at the group level and incentive design in profit centres and corporate units. Throughout the article, the oil industry serves as a case.

Keywords: risk management; incentive systems; decentralisation; petroleum industry; portfolio theory; price hedging; incentive design; oil industry; group level; financial results; energy finance. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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