Corporate governance mechanisms and disclosure in medium-sized listed firms: substitutes or complements?
Giovanni Satta,
Francesco Parola,
Giorgia Profumo and
Lara Penco
International Journal of Globalisation and Small Business, 2014, vol. 6, issue 1, 37-63
Abstract:
This paper, focusing on a non-Anglo-Saxon market, attempts to advance knowledge in the understanding of the complementary/substitute relationship between governance mechanisms and corporate disclosure in medium-sized listed firms. The manuscript applies content analysis techniques and proposes a disclosure quality score index, based on the quantity, the variety and the completeness of information disclosed. Moreover, OLS regression analysis is performed for testing the explanatory power of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms as determinants of communication quality. The results demonstrate the relevance of internal control mechanism, as well as their current substitutive nature respect to disclosure. In addition, empirical evidence show that a diffuse ownership along with the existence of a high number of committees are associated with increased qualitative levels of voluntary disclosure.
Keywords: corporate disclosure quality; corporate governance mechanisms; medium-sized listed firms; content analysis; communication quality; internal controls; diffuse ownership; committees; voluntary disclosure. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijgsbu:v:6:y:2014:i:1:p:37-63
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