Simultaneous online auctions: decisions on reserve prices

Ming Zhou, Shu Zhou and Dayong Yang

International Journal of Information and Decision Sciences, 2011, vol. 3, issue 2, 189-201

Abstract: The simultaneous nature of online auctions changes the horizon a bidder faces. A seller then has to make strategic and/or operational changes in order to adapt. In this study, a three-stage game model is constructed to analyse seller reserve price setting decision in online auctions. The decision of whether a seller should set a reserve price is shown to be a function of the covariance (between expected seller profits and expected rivals) and the expected number of bidders, where the covariance term is jointly determined by possible actions of other sellers.

Keywords: online auctions; simultaneous auctions; reserve prices; decision making; game theory; covariance. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=40423 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijidsc:v:3:y:2011:i:2:p:189-201

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in International Journal of Information and Decision Sciences from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sarah Parker ().