 Supply chain coordination and decisions under effort-dependent demand and customer balking behaviourGuang-Dong Liu, Tian-Jian Yang and Xue-Mei Zhang International Journal of Industrial and Systems Engineering, 2020, vol. 34, issue 1, 84-106 Abstract: The paper explores supply chain coordination under a sales effort-dependent demand and customer balking scenario and analyses the impacts of revenue- and cost-sharing contracts on the decisions of supply chain members. This paper subsequently develops a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer and examines two models that incorporate customer balking and sales efforts: in one model, the retailer offers a revenue sharing-only contract, and in the other model, the retailer and the supplier bargain on the revenue and cost-sharing contract. The results show that the revenue- and cost-sharing contract can coordinate the decentralised supply chain better than it can coordinate a centralised supply chain and that the effects of customer balking on the supply chain are clear; when customer balking occurs, the probability of a sale occurring can increase the profit of the supply chain, while the threshold of inventory and the sales effort can improve the marketing demand. Keywords: revenue- and cost-sharing contract; customer balking behaviour; newsvendor model; Stackelberg game; effort-dependent demand. (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijisen:v:34:y:2020:i:1:p:84-106 Access Statistics for this article More articles in International Journal of Industrial and Systems Engineering from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd |
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