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Negotiation system for PPP infrastructure contracts

Panagiotis Patsiadas and Demos C. Angelides

International Journal of Management and Decision Making, 2017, vol. 16, issue 2, 151-171

Abstract: The sophisticated negotiations during the final pre-contractual stage of public private partnership (PPP) infrastructure contracts are costly both in terms of time and resources. Thus, an early resolution of such issues brings significantly down the cost of this procedure. The proposed negotiation system aims to firstly set a common agenda of evaluated issues. The resolution of the algorithm used - based on tactics of experience (heuristics) - allocates the various issues to both contracting sides. The whole process results in apportionment of the issues that have been initially specified. Following that, each side has the right to 'define' - in the best way it believes - the various issues that have been appointed to it after the end of the procedure. This specific negotiation model rapidly provides a proposal for the allocation of complex issues between the involved parties, achieving a significant reduction in cost and resources spent.

Keywords: negotiation; negotiation system; public private partnership; PPP; infrastructure; concession contracts; trade-off; compensation; issues allocation; settlement. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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