Can shareholder rights protection reduce corruption in lending?

Siwapong Dheera-aumpon

International Journal of Monetary Economics and Finance, 2015, vol. 8, issue 2, 178-190

Abstract: An earlier study employing the original shareholder rights protection index from the pioneering law-and-finance paper shows that shareholder rights protection reduces the corruption of bank officials. The original index, however, has been criticised for its accuracy. Using a revised index, this paper reevaluates the relationship between shareholder protection and bank corruption. The results no longer support that shareholder protection can alone reduce bank corruption, but suggest that it can reduce bank corruption when private sector monitoring of banks is sufficiently promoted.

Keywords: law; finance; bank corruption; shareholder protection; shareholder rights protection; bank lending; banking industry; bank monitoring. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijmefi:v:8:y:2015:i:2:p:178-190

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