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Large shareholders' relationship, active shareholder and supervision

Tingli Liu and Qianqian Shi

International Journal of Monetary Economics and Finance, 2015, vol. 8, issue 2, 191-201

Abstract: This paper focuses on the impact of shareholders' relationship, active shareholder and earning quality. By combing relationship among top ten shareholders in China's A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2012, we find that shareholders' relationship does exist and accounts a high ratio, thus we propose to utilise active ownership to measure the control collocation. The study result indicates that within the active ownership including the largest shareholder, the better the board of directors can supervise, and the further earning quality would be improved. This effect is more pronounced when the number of active shareholder is large, suggesting that balancing function exists in the active shareholders.

Keywords: control rights; shareholder relationships; board of directors; earning quality; large shareholders; active shareholders; supervision; China; collocation; corporate governance. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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