Entry into 3G mobile telecommunications markets

Gary Madden, Erik Bohlin and Aaron Morey

International Journal of Management and Network Economics, 2012, vol. 2, issue 4, 374-391

Abstract: National regulatory authorities (NRAs) attempt to encourage participation in spectrum assignments by enhancing entrants' likelihood of success. The question this study addresses is: can NRA policy tools really affect the probability an entrant wins a 3G spectrum licence? In particular, the econometric analysis allows consideration of whether licence concession or mode of assignment encourages entry. The study finds that auction assignment processes only slightly increase the probability of entry, whilst price and quantity concessions have no impact.

Keywords: market entry; global markets; mobile phones; cell phones; 3G spectrum assignment; network economics; 3G mobile telecommunications; mobile communications; 3G licences; auction assignment; price concessions; quantity concessions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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