Location of response facilities: a simultaneous game between state and terrorist

Oded Berman, Arieh Gavious () and Rongbing Huang

International Journal of Operational Research, 2011, vol. 10, issue 1, 102-120

Abstract: We study a simultaneous move game with two players: a terrorist and a state where the latter installs facilities that provide support in case of a terrorist attack. While the state installs the facilities such that the metropolitan area attacked is the one that minimises her disutility (i.e. minimises 'loss'), the terrorist, who is not aware of the location of the facilities, attacks one of the metropolitan areas to maximise his utility. An analytic solution for some specific network structure is introduced. Numerically, we solve the problem for a case study of the 20 largest metropolitan areas in the USA.

Keywords: facilities location; terrorists; game theory; simultaneous moves; simultaneous games; terrorism; response facilities; terrorist attacks; network structure; metropolitan areas; USA; United States; support facilities; state facilities. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=37265 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijores:v:10:y:2011:i:1:p:102-120

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in International Journal of Operational Research from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sarah Parker ().