Equilibrium in a two-agent Assignment Problem

Giovanni Felici, Mariagrazia Mecoli, Pitu B. Mirchandani and Andrea Pacifici

International Journal of Operational Research, 2009, vol. 6, issue 1, 4-26

Abstract: In this paper we address a particular generalisation of the Assignment Problem (AP) in a Multi-Agent setting, where distributed agents share common resources. We consider the problem of determining Pareto-optimal solutions that satisfy a fairness criterion (equilibrium). We show that the solution obtained is equivalent to a Kalai–Smorodinsky solution of a suitably defined bargaining problem and characterise the computational complexity of finding such an equilibrium. Additionally, we propose an exact solution algorithm based on a branch-and-bound scheme that exploits bounds obtained by suitably rounding the solutions of the corresponding linear relaxation, and give the results of extensive computational experiments.

Keywords: competitive assignment; equilibrium; Pareto optimality; multi-agent systems; MAS; agent-based systems; fairness. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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