Optimal auctions for multi-unit procurement with volume discount bids

Raghav Kumar Gautam, N. Hemachandra, Y. Narahari, Hastagiri Prakash, Devadatta Kulkarni and Jeffrey D. Tew

International Journal of Operational Research, 2009, vol. 6, issue 1, 70-91

Abstract: In this paper, we design an optimal procurement mechanism for procuring multiple units of a single homogeneous item based on volume discount bids submitted by rational and intelligent suppliers. We develop an elegant auction mechanism, VD-OPT, that minimises the cost to the buyer, satisfying at the same time: Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (BIC); interim individual rationality.

Keywords: multi-unit procurement; volume discounts; incentive compatibility; individual rationality; optimal mechanisms; optimisation; optimal auctions; volume discount bids. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=26244 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijores:v:6:y:2009:i:1:p:70-91

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in International Journal of Operational Research from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sarah Parker ().