 Suppliers' collusion in public procurement: ex-ante determinants in zero initial contract price decrease auctions (the case of Russian healthcare)Evgenii V. Gilenko, Andrei E. Ivanov, Anastasia A. Golubeva and Olga N. Bezhenar International Journal of Procurement Management, 2023, vol. 17, issue 2, 180-203 Abstract: In public procurement, awareness of the public buyer of the potential collusive behaviour of suppliers at auctions may help mitigate the risks of only a slight decrease of the initial contract price (ICP). In this research, we focus on a special case of zero ICP decrease auctions (due to suppliers' collusion) to identify the factors that significantly increase the probability of occurrence of such cases. A unique cross-sectional dataset on more than 42,000 electronic reverse (price) auctions conducted over 2014-2020 by public hospitals of St. Petersburg (Russia) was collected; of these auctions, only 0.4% constituted the class of auctions with zero ICP decrease. Even in the presence of such huge sample imbalance, our analysis allowed to identify a number of factors that statistically significantly influenced the probability of zero ICP decrease at auctions in the Russian healthcare. Appropriate policy recommendations are provided in the paper. Keywords: suppliers' collusion; second-price auctions; public procurement; healthcare; rare event binary logistic regressions. (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijpman:v:17:y:2023:i:2:p:180-203 Access Statistics for this article More articles in International Journal of Procurement Management from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd |
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