Supply chain risk-sharing contracts from a buyers' perspective: content and experiences
Andreas Norrman
International Journal of Procurement Management, 2008, vol. 1, issue 4, 371-393
Abstract:
Incentive alignment, and risk and gain sharing, are argued to be key factors for the successful implementation of Supply Chain Management (SCM). Incentive-related issues can be improved by contract based, information-based and trust-based solutions. The focus of this article is on contract mechanisms used in the context of high demand volatility, supply allocation and outsourced supply chains. Two case illustrations from a high-tech industry (Agilent and Hewlett Packard) describe recently implemented risk-sharing contracts, as well as experiences and issues regarding their implementation from a buyers' perspective. Although the work of implementing these more formal contracts is demanding, buyers are pleased with the results and the buyers also report pleased suppliers. In the cases, the main barrier to implementing risk-sharing contracts seems to be the shift in mindset and culture needed internally, especially among purchasers.
Keywords: supply chain risks; risk sharing; incentive alignment; contracts; agency theory; information; trust; supply chain management; SCM; high demand volatility; supply allocation; supply chain outsourcing; high-tech industry; Agilent; Hewlett Packard; procurement management. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=18426 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijpman:v:1:y:2008:i:4:p:371-393
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in International Journal of Procurement Management from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sarah Parker ().