 Random selection: winning the lottery in construction contractsRobert Eadie and Martin McCavigan International Journal of Procurement Management, 2016, vol. 9, issue 2, 185-205 Abstract: Government procurement accounts for 10%-15% of gross domestic product. The majority of this is below the European Union financial thresholds and completed under local policy. From 2012, random selection (RS) has been used as part of the selection mechanism. For the first time, this paper analyses and compares RS to the rotation process used in frameworks. The empirical data was gathered from the public sector client and private sectors via structured Limesurvey™ questionnaires. The results indicate that RS is considered transparent with high accountability. However, concerns are raised over safeguards against abuse or manipulation. The impact of using RS on quality, value for money and open competition indicated greater private sector concern. Agreement was achieved on it not always providing the best economic operator, that size of organisations involved does not matter and there is adequate competition. However, the procurement policy for the adoption of RS for certain contract types was deemed correct. Keywords: random selection; construction contracts; government policy; government procurement; UK; United Kingdom; transparency; accountability; abuse; manipulation; quality; value for money; open competition. (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijpman:v:9:y:2016:i:2:p:185-205 Access Statistics for this article More articles in International Journal of Procurement Management from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd |
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