 Development of efficient combinatorial auction mechanism for airport slot allocationShankar Vinay Arul, Angappa Gunasekaran, S.P. Nachiappan and B. Ramasamy International Journal of Services and Operations Management, 2007, vol. 3, issue 4, 427-443 Abstract: The current allocation of slots in congested airports is fraught with deficiencies because of the liberalisation of air transportation undertaken all over the world. The existing grandfather rights rule is slowly being replaced with auctions. In the airport slot allocation problem, in order to effectively auction the slots, multiple-item auctions are employed. It is in this aspect that combinatorial auctions are employed, as they are the most efficacious in dealing with complimentarity. Since the existing mechanisms are more inclined towards maximising the auctioneer's profit – with the monetary issue being the only concern – they lead to biased allocations. Therefore, this paper develops a model and proposes a mechanism that could overcome the shortcomings of the existing auctioning procedures by incorporating the concepts of welfare issues with due consideration given to the flight capacity to effectively allot the slots. Keywords: slots; resource allocation; NP hard; combinatorial auctions; airport slot allocation; biased allocations; welfare issues; flight capacity; airline industry. (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijsoma:v:3:y:2007:i:4:p:427-443 Access Statistics for this article More articles in International Journal of Services and Operations Management from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd |
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