Going-concern opinions and corporate governance

Ning Ren and Yun Zhu

International Journal of Banking, Accounting and Finance, 2020, vol. 11, issue 2, 281-302

Abstract: This paper looks into the issuance of auditor's going-concern opinions and investigates how it triggers subsequent changes in corporate governance, specifically, the corporate control, executive compensation and management turnover. Using a difference-in-difference approach with the exogenous shock of Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) in 2007, we find that going-concern opinion leads to the decrease in blockholder ownership and institutional ownership, the reduction in CEO's cash compensation and total compensation, and the increase in the turnovers of top executives and auditors, indicating strong monitoring function of the auditors.

Keywords: going-concern opinion; corporate governance; blockholder ownership; institutional ownership; CEO compensation; CEO turnover. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=106717 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:injbaf:v:11:y:2020:i:2:p:281-302

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in International Journal of Banking, Accounting and Finance from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sarah Parker ().