On effects of asymmetric information on non-life insurance prices under competition

Hansjörg Albrecher and Daily-Amir Dalit

International Journal of Data Analysis Techniques and Strategies, 2017, vol. 9, issue 4, 287-299

Abstract: We extend a game-theoretic model of Dutang et al. (2013) for non-life insurance pricing under competition among insurance companies and investigate the effects of asymmetric information on the equilibrium premium. We study Bayesian Nash equilibria as well as Bayesian Stackelberg equilibria and illustrate the sensitivity of equilibrium prices to various forms and magnitudes of information asymmetry through some numerical examples.

Keywords: non-life insurance pricing; premium; non-cooperative game theory; asymmetric information; Nash equilibrium; Stackelberg equilibrium; price sensitivity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:injdan:v:9:y:2017:i:4:p:287-299

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